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Abstract 
Objectives: Research illustrates that people hold beliefs about the causes and 
solutions to illness.   This study aimed to assess the consistency in these beliefs in 
terms of their variation according to type of problem and whether they are consistent 
with each other.   Further the study aimed to assess whether they are open to change 
and whether changing beliefs about cause resulted in a subsequent shift in beliefs 
about solutions.  Design: Experimental factorial 3 (problem) X 2 (manipulated cause) 
design using vignettes.  Methods: 279 participants rated their beliefs about the cause 
and solution of one of three problems (depression, obesity, sleep problems) following 
a vignette which described the causes as either psychological or biomedical.    
Results: Beliefs about causes and solutions varied according to type of problem 
indicating that beliefs are illness specific.   The results also showed that people hold 
beliefs about causes and solutions which are consistent with each other as an 
endorsement of a psychological cause was consistently reflected in a belief that a 
psychological solution was most appropriate and effective.   A similar pattern was 
seen for beliefs about biomedical causes and solutions.    Finally the results showed 
that beliefs were open to manipulation and that a shift in beliefs about causes resulted 
in a parallel shift in beliefs about solutions.   Conclusions: People hold beliefs about 
causes and solution which vary according to type of problem.   However, they are 
always consistent with each other and a shift in one set of beliefs results in a 
significant shift in the other set.     
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Introduction 
In 1982, Brickman and colleagues analysed different models of helping and coping 
behaviours and argued that they could be understood in terms of attributions for the 
causes and solutions to the problem being considered.   In particular, Brickman et al 
(1982) described the moral model in which the individual is responsible for both the 
cause and the solution to a problem, the enlightenment model whereby the individual 
is responsible for the cause but not the solution, the biomedical model whereby the 
individual is responsible for neither the cause nor the solution to a problem and the 
compensatory model in which the individual is not responsible for the cause but is 
responsible for the solution.    
This approach has proved a useful basis for classifying clinical interventions.   It also 
illustrates how beliefs about causes and solutions can either be consistent or 
inconsistent with each other.   In line with this, some research has explored whether 
the different permutations of beliefs about causes and solutions relate to patient 
outcomes.   For example, some studies indicate that a compensatory model produces 
the best outcomes for managing alcoholism (Brickman et al. 1982), recovering from 
accidents (Frey et al, 1987) and patients adjusting to breast cancer (Taylor et al, 
1984).   This suggests that unmatched beliefs about causes and solutions may be most 
effective.    In contrast, however, some research suggests a role for matched beliefs in 
predicting improved health outcomes.   For example, research exploring adherence to 
asthma medication concluded that patients are more likely to take their medication if 
their beliefs about the cause of their problem are consistent with their beliefs about its 
treatment (Horne, 1997; Horne and Weinman, 1999; 2002).   Similarly, from a study 
of successful weight loss and maintenance, Ogden (2000) concluded that the ‘success 
stories’ were more likely to believe that behaviour was central to both the cause and 
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solution of their weight problem.    Furthermore, consistent beliefs about causes and 
solutions have also been reported to relate to the effectiveness of weight loss 
medication (Ogden and Sidhu, 2006), uptake of rehabilitation following heart attack 
(Petrie et al, 1996) and sustained changes in diet, smoking and exercise behaviours 
(Ogden and Hills, in press).  A degree of consistency between beliefs about causes 
and solutions would therefore seem potentially to relate to health outcomes.    
Research has also explored whether beliefs about causes and solutions differ 
according to the problem being considered (Ogden et al, 1999; 2001) and Leventhal et 
al (1984; 1992; 1997) has argued that illness representations are illness specific.   For 
example, Ogden et al (1999; 2001) illustrated that whereas doctors tend to see 
depression from a more biomedical perspective they see obesity as the product of 
behaviour.  Furthermore, some research has also explored population differences for 
these two dimensions of illness representations with a focus on differences between 
GPs’ and patients’ beliefs about depression and obesity (Ogden et al, 1999; 2001) and 
patients and non patients views about heart disease (French et al, 2001).  Similarly, 
Brickman et al (1982) suggested that many of the problems characterizing 
relationships between help givers and patient arise from the fact that the two parties 
are applying different models of illness and Wile (1977) argued that ‘Many of the 
classic disputes which arise between clients and therapists can be attributed to 
differences in their theories of aetiology and cure’.   
Such a focus on beliefs about causes and solutions finds reflection in the self 
regulatory model of illness behaviour which describes how individuals develop illness 
representations that inform the ways in which they adjust and respond to illness (eg. 
Leventhal et al, 1997).  Central to these representations are people’s beliefs about the 
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cause of their illness which can range from psychological causes such as health 
related behaviours, cognitions or personality to biomedical causes such as a virus or 
genetics through to social factors such as pollution.    In addition, the self regulatory 
model also describes a central role for beliefs about treatments in terms what types of 
treatment should be used for what problem and whether a treatment is deemed 
effective.   Leventhal and colleagues suggest that illness behaviour is governed by the 
‘if – then’ rules with beliefs about causes translating into subsequent action 
(Leventhal et al, 1984; 1992; 1997).   For example, Leventhal and colleagues argue 
that individuals decide whether or not to carry out behaviours such as seeking help or 
taking medication based upon their beliefs about what has caused their problem.  
Accordingly, a person may believe ‘if my heart attack was caused by an inactive 
lifestyle then I will do more exercise’.   This would then lead them to follow their 
doctor’s advice regarding rehabilitation.    In contrast, however, if their cognitions 
were ‘if my heart attack was caused by over using my heart, then I must take more 
rest’ they would find recommendations to follow an exercise regimen strange and 
confusing.   Leventhal and colleagues also argue that the ‘if – then’ rules apply across 
the range of the different dimensions of illness representations such as time line, 
consequences and control and cure.   For example, a belief about how long an illness 
is going to last for may well influence decisions to seek help and a belief about the 
controllability of an illness would also impact upon decisions to take medication.   
Research has described such associations as a ‘goodness of fit’ between different sets 
of cognitions (Petrie and Weinman, 2006).    Two recent studies have examined the 
extent to which beliefs about causes are linked to beliefs about solutions.  Kuppin and 
Carpiano (2006) explored lay beliefs about mental illness and concluded that a belief 
in biological causes was associated with greater endorsement of biological solutions.   
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In a similar vein, Ogden and Flannagan (in press) examined GPs’ and lay people’s 
beliefs about obesity and similarly reported that a belief in a biological cause of 
obesity was related to a stronger belief in the effectiveness of obesity medication.  In 
contrast, an endorsement of policy change as a solution was related to a belief that 
obesity was caused by social factors.  This pattern of consistency, however, was only 
apparent in GPs and not the lay sample.   
Research therefore shows that people hold representations about illness, and that 
beliefs about the causes and solutions to illness are central to these representations.  
Some studies have explored differences in these beliefs across different populations, 
whilst others have explored differences by type of problem being considered.   
Furthermore, research has also addressed the impact of these beliefs upon health 
outcomes.   Research has therefore focused on the consistency in these beliefs.   To 
date however, no research has examined whether beliefs about causes and solutions 
are open to change and whether a shift in one set of beliefs would result in a 
subsequent shift in the other.    This would seem particularly pertinent if the degree of 
consistency could relate to patient outcomes and is in line with Leventhal et al’s 
(1984) notion of the ‘if – then’ rules.   The present study therefore aimed to explore 
whether beliefs about causes and solutions are consistent across a range of health 
problems and whether they are consistent with each other.    In addition, the study 
aimed to assess whether they can be manipulated and whether a shift in beliefs about 
causes results in a subsequent shift in beliefs about solutions.  The present study 
focused on beliefs about obesity, depression and sleep problems.   These were 
selected to present the participants with a range of familiar problems for which either 
a biomedical or psychological cause and solution would seem viable. 
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Method 
Design 
The study used an experimental factorial design with 2 independent variables; 
problem (depression vs sleep problems vs obesity) and experimental manipulation 
(biomedical cause vs psychological cause).  The dependent variables were; beliefs 
about causes (biomedical and psychological), beliefs about appropriateness of 
treatment (biomedical and psychological), and beliefs about effectiveness of treatment 
(biomedical or psychological).  A between subjects design was employed with each 
participant receiving one vignette describing one problem (depression, sleep 
problems, or obesity) which indicated either a biomedical or psychological cause.  
Such a design enabled participants’ beliefs about causes to be manipulated and to 
assess the impact of this upon their beliefs about solutions.    
 
Sample 
Questionnaires were distributed to 390 students at a University through lectures and 
laboratory classes.   The study was explained to the students by the researcher who 
were asked to stay and complete the questionnaire.  Equal numbers of questionnaires 
were randomly handed out to participants for each condition and each participant 
received one vignette.  Completed questionnaires were received from 279 students 
(response rate = 76%).  The non responders were those who left the lecture theatre or 
laboratory without completing the questionnaire.   No data is available on these 
students.  
 
Procedure 
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Participants were asked to take part in a study designed to explore their beliefs about a 
range of illnesses.   They were then asked to complete the different rating scales after 
reading the case vignette.  Ethical approval was obtained via the University Ethics 
committee.  
 
Experimental manipulation 
In order to manipulate participants’ beliefs about the causes of the problem, vignettes 
were prepared for each problem (depression, sleep problems, and obesity) designed to 
emphasise either the psychological or biomedical causes of the problem.  All vignettes 
started with a description of the problem as follows: ‘Person X is suffering from 
depression / sleep problems / obesity’.  To define the cause of the problem as 
psychological the vignette then stated ‘and has recently experienced high levels of 
stress’.   To define the problem as biomedical the vignette then read ‘which runs in the 
family’.  This resulted in 6 vignettes which varied in terms of type of problem 
(depression, obesity, sleep problems) and experimental manipulation of cause 
(psychological vs biomedical). 
 
Measures 
After reading the vignette participants completed a questionnaire which measured the 
following variables:  
 
Beliefs about the problem 
Participants rated a series of statements using 5 point Likert scales ranging from ‘not 
at all’ (1) to ‘entirely / completely’ (5).  These items related to the following 
constructs.  The items for each construct were kept as consistent as possible between 
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problems but some variability was necessary so that the causes and solutions reflected 
realistic approaches for each problem. 
  
i) Causes of the problem 
Participants were asked to what extent they believed 6 factors were causes of the 
problem which varied according to the problem being described.   These were 
conceptualised as either biomedical causes or psychological causes as follows in line 
with the existing literature (Leventhal et al, 1997):  
Biomedical: ‘genetics’, ‘brain chemical imbalance’, and ‘hormones’ (for all 
problems). 
Psychological: Depression: ‘worry’, ‘negative thought processes’, ‘upsetting life 
events’; Obesity: ‘low self esteem’, ‘eating the wrong food’, ‘not doing enough 
exercise’; Sleep problems: ‘anxiety’, ‘anger’, ‘upsetting life events’. 
 
ii) Appropriate treatment 
Participants were asked to what extent they thought the problem should be treated by 
6 different treatments which were conceptualised as biomedical or psychological.  
Biomedical: Depression: ‘medication’, ‘a doctor’, ‘a psychiatrist’; obesity: ‘surgery’, 
‘medication’, ‘a doctor’; Sleep problems: ‘medication’, ‘a doctor’, ‘alternative 
medicines”. 
Psychological: Depression: ‘counselling’, ‘therapy’, ‘speaking to friend or family’; 
obesity: ‘change of diet’, ‘change of exercise patterns’, ‘counselling’; sleep 
problems: ‘therapy’, ‘speaking to friend or family’, ‘counselling’. 
 
iii) Effectiveness of treatment 
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Participants were also asked to indicate how effective they thought the treatment of 
the problem would be in terms of 6 factors which were the same as those described 
above for appropriateness of treatment.  
 
Mean scores were then computed for a biomedical cause, a psychological cause, a 
biomedical treatment, a psychological treatment, the effectiveness of a biomedical 
treatment and the effectiveness of a psychological treatment. 
 
Profile characteristics 
Participants finally recorded their age (yrs), gender and personal experience of the 
problem and if anyone close to them had suffered from the problem. 
 
Data analysis 
Dat was analysed using SPSS.  Data was checked for distribution and heterogeneity of 
variance (all ps>0.05).   The results were then analysed to describe participants’ 
profile characteristics, to explore correlations between beliefs about causes and beliefs 
about solutions across all problems and to assess the main effects of problem 
(depression, obesity, sleep problems) and the experimental manipulation (biomedical 
or psychological causes) on participants’ beliefs about causes and solutions using two-
way 3 (problem) by 2 (manipulation) ANOVA and post hoc tests (LSD).    For the 
ANOVA, problem (depression, obesity, sleep problems) and manipulation 
(biomedical cause vs psychological cause) were entered as independent variables and 
beliefs about causes, treatments and effectiveness of treatments were entered as 
dependent variables. 
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Results 
1. Profile characteristics 
The participants’ profile characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
-Insert table 1 about here – 
The participants were equally split by gender and were mostly in their twenties.  The 
sample was equally divided according to the experimental manipulation.   The results 
also showed that about a third had personally experienced each of the problems in 
question and just over a third had known someone who had experienced the problem.   
These were not used to explore between group differences as the numbers for each 
problem and by each manipulation were too small. 
 
2. Correlations between beliefs about causes and solutions 
Correlations between beliefs about causes and solutions are shown in table 2. 
-insert table 2 about here – 
The results showed significant positive correlations between beliefs about 
psychological causes and psychological solutions and between beliefs about 
biomedical causes and biomedical solutions.   The results also showed significant 
negative correlations between psychological causes and biomedical solutions and 
biomedical causes and psychological solutions.   This indicates that individuals tend 
to hold beliefs about causes and solutions which are consistent with each other. 
 
3. Effect of type of problem and experimental manipulation  
The data were analysed using 2-way-ANOVA to assess the main effects of both the 
problem (obesity vs depression vs sleep problems) and the experimental manipulation 
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(biomedical causes vs psychological cause).  The interaction between the two was 
also assessed.  These results are shown in Table 3. 
-insert table 3 about here – 
Main effect of the type of problem 
The results showed significant main effect of problem for beliefs about psychological 
causes, psychological treatment, biomedical treatment, psychological treatment 
effectiveness and biomedical treatment effectiveness.  No differences were found for 
biomedical causes, indicating that the three problems were viewed as being equally 
caused biomedically.   Post hoc tests indicated that sleep was viewed as more likely to 
be caused by psychological factors than depression or obesity; that obesity was least 
appropriate for psychological treatments; that sleep problems were most appropriate 
for biomedical treatments, and that both psychological and biomedical treatments 
were more effective for sleep problems compared to obesity and depression.    
Participants therefore differentiated in their beliefs about causes and solutions in terms 
of the type of problem being considered. 
 
Main effect of experimental manipulation 
The results showed a significant main effect of the manipulation for all beliefs about 
the problem.  Post hoc tests indicated that participants who were told that the problem 
had a psychological cause were more likely to believe that the problem had a 
psychological cause, that a psychological treatment was more appropriate and that 
psychological treatments would be more effective.  In parallel, participants who were 
told that the problem had a biomedical cause were more likely to believe that the 
problem had a biomedical cause; that a biomedical treatment was more appropriate 
and that a biomedical treatment would be more effective.    The manipulation was 
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designed to change beliefs about causes.   These results suggest that this was effective 
and that this manipulation also had a subsequent effect upon beliefs about solutions. 
 
Interaction between nature of problem and experimental manipulation 
The results showed a significant interaction between the nature of problem and the 
experimental manipulation for psychological and biomedical treatments in terms of 
both appropriateness and effectiveness.  Therefore although the manipulation changed 
participants’ beliefs about solutions this effect varied according to the type of problem 
being considered.   In particular, the means indicated that for beliefs about 
psychological treatment, depression was more open to manipulation and for beliefs 
about biomedical treatment and the effectiveness of both psychological and 
biomedical treatments, sleep problems were more open to manipulation.    
 
Discussion 
The present aimed to explore how consistent individuals’ beliefs are about causes and 
solutions, whether these beliefs can be changed and whether a change in one set of 
beliefs results in a subsequent shift in the other set. 
 
In terms of consistency across health problems, the results showed that beliefs about 
causes and solution varied depending upon the problem being considered.   Previous 
research illustrates differences in beliefs in terms of the population being studied (eg. 
French et al, 2001; Ogden et al, 1999; 2001) and it has been argued that such 
differences could account for problems arising between patients and health 
professionals (Brickman et al, 1982).   The results from this study support Leventhal 
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et al’s argument that illness representations are illness specific (Leventhal et al, 1984; 
1992; 1997) and suggest that beliefs are not consistent across problem type.    
 
In contrast, however, the results showed that beliefs about cause and solution do tend 
to be consistent with each other.   In particular, those who endorsed a psychological 
cause also tended to endorse a psychological treatment with a similar pattern 
emerging for beliefs about biomedical causes and solutions.   This provides support 
for previous research that has reported consistency for beliefs about causes and 
solutions for both mental illness and obesity (Kuppin and Carpiano, 2006; Ogden and 
Flannagan, in press).  It is also in line with Leventhal and colleagues’ notion  of the ‘if 
– then’ rule with beliefs about causes translating into subsequent action (Leventhal et 
al, 1984; 1992; 1997) .    The results from the present study provide evidence for this 
association and illustrate consistency across these different dimensions of illness 
representations.    
 
This consistency was also supported by the results of the experimental manipulation 
as although beliefs about causes and solutions changed following the simple 
manipulation, they changed in a consistent fashion; changing beliefs about cause 
resulted in a subsequent shift in beliefs about solutions.   Previous research indicates 
that matched models of causes and solutions are predictive of better patient outcomes 
such as adherence and behaviour change (Horne and Weinman, 1999; 2002; Ogden 
and Hills, in press; Ogden and Sidhu, 2006).   These results illustrate that many 
people show such matched models of illness.  Furthermore the results indicate that 
beliefs can be changed but that they tend to change in a consistent way with beliefs 
about causes and solutions remaining in line with each other. 
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There are however, some problems that need to be addressed.   First the study utilised 
vignettes as a means to access people’s beliefs about causes and solutions.   
Furthermore, the study involved a non patient sample.   Both these approaches have 
their limitations as beliefs are being accessed in an abstract sense rather than about a 
concrete problem that the person is currently experiencing.   Such an approach was 
necessary for the present study as the aim was to explore beliefs across a range of 
problems (ie depression, obesity and sleep problems) and it would not have been 
possible to find a group who were currently experiencing all these problems.   Much 
research also illustrates that people hold beliefs about illnesses even in the absence of 
symptoms (eg. Leventhal et al, 1997) and it was these beliefs that were the focus of 
the present study.   The study therefore provides some insights into beliefs about 
causes and solutions to a range of health problems and how these beliefs are 
associated with each other.  Further research is needed to enable these results to be 
generalised beyond the confines of a student sample and to assess whether 
consistency is also common amongst a clinical population. 
 
To conclude, the results from the present study indicate that although beliefs about 
causes and solutions vary according to type of problem they tend to be with consistent 
with each other and, if manipulated, they change in consistent ways.    These results 
have positive implications for patient health as such consistent models have been 
shown to be better predictors of changes in patient outcomes.   Further, if beliefs can 
be changed then interventions offering particular solutions could include a 
manipulation to facilitate the development of matched causal beliefs.  However, such 
a consistent approach to causes and solutions may not always be of benefit, 
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particularly if it is the health professional rather than the patient who holds such 
consistent beliefs.   It has been argued that treatment interventions for health related 
problems are often developed based upon an understanding of the cause.   For 
example, as obesity is generally considered a problem of overeating and under 
activity, treatments emphasise similarly behavioural solutions (Ogden, 2005).  Similar 
consistency can also be found for many health problems which are conceptualised as a 
product of behaviour.   Although in line with much psychological thinking such a 
consistent approach ignores and underestimates the potential contribution of non 
behavioural solutions to behavioural problems including structural changes, changes 
in policy and biomedical interventions.   By endorsing a consistent approach many 
health professionals may neglect alternative solutions which are not in line with their 
beliefs about causality.  People therefore do seem to hold beliefs about cause and 
solution which are consistent with each other.   For patients trying to respond to or 
adopt a particular solution, such consistency may well be predictive of positive 
outcomes.   But for health professionals designing or recommending interventions, 
such consistency may limit their perspective on what constitutes a suitable solution. 
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Table 1: Participants’ profile characteristics 
 
Variable N / % / X / SD 
Sex Male  = 147     (49.5%) 
Female = 150     (50.5%) 
Age Mean = 21.6 (SD= 2) Range: 18 – 28 
Personal 
problem 
No = 198             (66.7%) 
Yes = 99              (33.3%) 
Other person 
had problem 
No = 176             (59.3%) 
Yes = 121            (40.7%) 
Problem Sleep = 64           (21.5%) 
Depression =116 (39.1%) 
Obesity = 117     (39.4%) 
Exp Cause Biomedical = 132  (44.4%) 
Psychological = 165  (55.6%) 
   
 
 
Sleep 
 
Depression 
 
Obesity 
 
 
Randomisation 
Personal problem Condition 
 No = 39 (64%)  
 Yes = 25 (36%) 
Biomed = 23 (35.9%) 
Psy = 41 (64.1%) 
No = 75 (64.7%) 
Yes = 41 (35.3%) 
Biomed = 52 (44.1%) 
Psy = 64 (55.9%) 
No = 84 (71.8%) 
Yes = 33 (28.2%) 
Biomed = 57 (48.7%) 
Psy = 60 (51.3%) 
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Table 2: Correlations between beliefs about causes and solutions 
 
 Psych. 
cause 
Biomed. 
Cause 
Psych. 
Treat 
Biomed. 
Treat 
Psych. 
Effect 
Biomed
Effect 
Psych. 
Cause 
      
Biomed 
Cause 
-0.48* 
 
     
Psych. 
Treat 
0.47* 
 
-0.39* 
 
    
Biomed 
Treat 
-0.43* 
 
0.39* 
 
-0.39* 
 
   
Psych. 
Effect 
0.51* 
 
-0.45* 
 
0.45 * 
 
-0.37* 
 
  
Biomed 
Effect 
-0.39* 
 
0.44* 
 
-0.31* 
 
0.54 * 
 
-0.36* 
 
 
 
*p<0.0001 
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Table 3: Effects of problem and experimental manipulation on means scores (SDs) for beliefs about causes and solutions 
 
 Sleep  Depression  Obesity  Main effect 
Problem 
Main effect 
manipulation 
Manip X 
Problem 
 Biomed Psych Biomed Psych Biomed Psych F  /   eta2 / P F  /  eta2 / P F  / eta2 / P 
Psych 
cause 
2.61 
(0.54) 
3.76 
(0.42) 
2.29 
(0.54) 
3.60 
(0.59) 
2.41 
(0.55) 
3.70 
(0.55) 
3.86 / 0.03 
p = 0.02 
359 / 0.56 
p = 0.0001 
0.62/0.004 
p = 0.54 
Biomed 
cause 
3.28 
(0.47) 
2.34 
(0.5) 
3.36 
(0.63) 
2.26 
(0.56) 
3.43 
(0.66) 
2.44 
(0.52) 
1.76 / 0.01 
p = 0.173 
205 / 0.41 
p = 0.0001 
0.54 / 0.004 
p = 0.59 
Psych 
treat 
2.70 
(0.6) 
3.23 
(0.55) 
2.47 
(0.62) 
3.72 
(0.51) 
2.56 
(0.61) 
3.20 
(0.61) 
4.09 / 0.03 
p = 0.018 
125 / 0.30 
p = 0.0001 
10.49/ 0.07 
p =0.0001 
Biomed  
treat 
3.19 
(0.46) 
3.10 
(0.6) 
3.50 
(0.62) 
2.36 
(0.56) 
3.43 
(0.64) 
2.34 
(0.54) 
4.08 / 0.03 
p = 0.018 
116.1/ 0.29 
p = 0.0001 
18.2/ 0.11 
p =0.0001 
Psych 
effect 
2.87 
(0.51) 
3.62 
(0.62) 
2.34 
(0.63) 
3.58 
(0.52) 
2.40 
(0.46) 
3.3 
(0.63) 
10 / 0.07 
p = 0.0001 
202 / 0.41 
p = 0.0001 
4.9/ 0.03 
p = 0.008 
Biomed 
effect 
3.07 
(0.54) 
3.14 
(0.55) 
3.28 
(0.65) 
2.30 
(0.5) 
3.33 
(0.63) 
2.50 
(0.53) 
5.6 / 0.04 
p = 0.004 
66.07 / 0.19 
p = 0.0001 
17.26/ 0.11 
p =0.0001 
 
 
